Maps and GIS

Maps and information on GIS study of the Vietnam War

      The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968 relies extensively on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software to analyze the wealth of data collected during the Vietnam War. This enables the visualization of events throughout the nation that could indicate the effectiveness of the various propaganda programs the combatants undertook.

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Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software is becoming increasingly important in the modern world. GIS allows the layering of data over a geographical space to enhance analysis and modeling options. Terrain, elevation, population, incidents, boundaries and thousands of other data series can be laid on top of each other, allowing an analyst to access nearly infinite combinations of data. On paper, these layers cannot be peeled back at will; GIS allows this. GIS software packages have existed for about 30 years; however, it has only been the last decade that the first tentative steps towards using them in historical scholarship began.

For the study the Vietnam War, a wealth of data, nearly untouched by historians awaits exploitation. Thanks to Secretary of Defense McNamara’s obsession with data, MACV collected data on all aspects of the war. Much of this data is associated to a geographical location, which makes it ideal for use in GIS, with the proper reformatting. All this data is imperfect. That is, it was collected during wartime. Grid locations were entered incorrectly at times, leading to hamlets located in the South China Sea, for example. Such errors require manual corrections. Expecting perfection in wartime is unrealistic. However, if treated by historians as any document should, carefully weighed and scrutinized, these data sets provide new avenues to analyze this complex war.

Utilizing the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS), Southeast Asia Friendly Forces File, the Viet Cong Initiated Incidents (VCII) File and Hamlet Evaluation System files, these maps indicate the security situation in Quang Nam Province in December 1967. Analysis of these first two maps indicate that in the lead up to the Tet Offensive, NVA/VC strength was concentrated south of the Song River and the Marines were steadily driving them towards VC Base area 116. Most VC inititated incidents that month were within 10 miles of that river. This counters the often made assertion that the North was trying to draw the Americans out of the coastal region in preparation for the Tet Offensive (i.e. Khe Sanh). Mapping the data monthly through 1967, clearly shows the momentum was on the Allies side. The map below overlays a hotspot VC incident density on Terrorist Incident event types and friendly manuever battalion locations. Red circles were the Marines priority objectives for that year.

The map below extracts information from the TIRS and VCII files, overlaid on a map depicting population density in the fall of 1967. This map clearly shows the Viet Cong and PAVN focus that fall on assassinations along the densely packed coastal region, in contrast to many historical interpretations that argue the VC/DRV goal at this time was to draw forces away from the cities in the pre-Tet Offensive period.

Other example maps:
Lam Dong Province, 1967. These two maps show Lam Dong Province in December 1967, HES security scores and VC Initiated incidents above, and tribal overlay on HES security scores below.

Hotspots, pre-Khe Sanh. This map shows hotspot analysis of the Viet Cong Initiated Incidents prior to Tet Offensive. It clearly shows the main effort was in the heavily populated coastal zones. Data used includes the Distict Population Overlay, VCII File, Hotspot analysis of the VCII, TIRS File, and VC Base Area File.

This map shows the security status of First Corps Tactical Zone during the first week of January 1968. It overlays the friendly forces maneuver battalions by type, VC Terror incidents by type, as well as VC Base Area locations.